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Abstract
It is shown that the standard Kolmogorov model for probability spaces cannot
in general allow the elimination but of only a small amount of probabilistic re-
dundancy. This issue, a purely theoretical weakness, not necessarily related to
empirical reality, appears not to have received enough attention in foundational
studies of Probability Theory.
1. The Need for a Match
Several recent works have brought to attention the events during the first decades
of the 20th century which culminated in 1933 with Kolmogorov’s foundation of
modern Probability Theory in his Grundbegriffe, see Shafer & Vovk [1], Vovk &
Shafer, von Plato, or Bilova et.al.
Ever since Probability Theory first started to emerge in the work of Jacob Bernoulli
early in the 18th century, there has been an interest in the extent to which such a
theory may in fact match with the empirical reality it is supposed to model.
The axiom regarding ”total probability”, namely
P (A ∪B) = P (A) + P (B)
for two events A and B which cannot happen simultaneously, or the axiom for
”compound probability”, namely
P (A ∩B) = P (A)P (B |A)
for two arbitrary events did not lead to significant problems when related to em-
pirical reality.
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What on the other hand led to such problems was the so called Cournot Principle
which in one of its formulations, Cournot, stated that :
The physically impossible event is therefore the one that has infinitely
small probability, and only this remark gives substance - objective and
phenomenal value - to the theory of mathematical probability.
This idea, however, did not originate with Cournot. Jacob Bernoulli in his 1713
Ars Conjectandi proved what would later be called the Law of Large Numbers
which in simple terms says that in a large enough sequence of independent trials
of the same event there is a high probability that the frequency of the event will be
close to its probability. And Bernoulli commented that we can consider that high
probability as a certainty, and thus use frequency as an estimate of probability.
2. Falsifiability
Only recently in the history of science, and owing to Karl Popper, did the idea
clearly arise and got expressed of a proper test of the possible match, or otherwise,
between a given scientific theory and the empirical reality it is supposed to model.
And the test of such a match which Popper suggested, and called ”falsifiability”,
consists of a set of fundamental experiments clearly specified by the respective
theory, experiments which can effectively be performed within the empirical real-
ity. And in case any of them may happen to fail, then the theory as a whole is
considered inadequate.
Obviously, two conditions should be met by any such set of fundamental experi-
ments :
• the set of required experiments must be finite, and preferably small,
• each such experiment should only require a finite time to perform, and prefer-
ably, a short enough time at that.
When for instance, Einstein came up in 1915 with his theory of General Relativity,
he himself suggest several such fundamental experiments. One of them was the
celebrated bending of light rays near to a massive mass. And early in 1919, during
a Sun eclipse, Arthur Eddington managed to show that General Relativity passed
that test, since the amount of bending predicted by that theory was in good cor-
respondence with the empirical bending measured.
Needless to say, the various theories of Physics, including General Relativity, have
so far been required to satisfy experiments which happen to conform to the above
two conditions.
In this regard, one of the major deficiencies of String Theory is precisely the fact
that, so far, it cannot offer any experiment which could effectively be performed
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and respect the above two conditions.
3. The Special Situation of Probability Theory
As far as the mentioned Cournot Principle is concerned, it is quite obvious that
any empirical experiments which would be able to test it in the sense of Popper’s
falsifiability are duty bound to fail the second above condition. Indeed, there is
simply no a priori way of knowing how large a finite sequence of independent ex-
periments of the same event should be, in order to give the possibility for obtaining
a sufficiently reliable acceptance or rejection of that principle.
In this way, Probability Theory is in the special position to be unable to either
confirm or falsify itself on effective empirical grounds. And this comes from the
simple fact that aiming to establish a close enough connection between frequency
and probability cannot lead to empirical tests which satisfy the above second con-
dition, since any such close enough connection can only stand or fail at the infinite
limit.
Needless to say, even if not clearly and explicitly enough, there has been an aware-
ness of this problem, and consequently, a variety of solutions has been proposed,
as seen for instance, in Shafer & Vovk [1].
Among the more recent major ideas in this regard, one can mention the following
two :
• Relating probability to complexity in the sense of Kolmogorov.
• Relating probability to games, Shafer & Vovk [2].
The first idea, already about half a century old, has proved to be particularly
seminal, and not only in Probability Theory, but also in several major branches
of Mathematics, as seen for instance in Chaitin.
The second idea, a more recent one, may at first appear as risking to lead well
beyond what would conventionally be understood by randomness or probability.
Indeed, Kolmogorov complexity is defined by the performance of the shortest pos-
sible program on a universal Turing machine. On the other hand, a game, as
suggested for instance in Shafer & Vovk [2], Vovk & Shafer, comprises more than
one conscious player. Thus one may become concerned that the processes which
such a game can generate may in fact go beyond what one usually conceives of as
being random or probabilistic.
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4. Redundancies : An Omission ?
It appears that, historically, the concerns related to Probability Theory have been
focused upon its possible match with empirical reality, and dealt mainly, if not in
fact, mostly with the issue of the relation between frequency and probability, a re-
lation which as mentioned above, proves not to be within the realms of customary
empirical tests.
And during this long ongoing process, it appears that an important internal purely
theoretical weakness of Probability Theory - a weakness which is clearly there, even
if no relation to empirical reality is involved - was not given attention. Namely,
let us consider an arbitrary probability space
(1) (Ω,F , P )
where F is a σ-algebra of subsets of Ω, whileP : F −→ [0, 1] is the respective
probability. Further, let us assume, as customary, that
(1a) { ω } ∈ F , for ω ∈ Ω
There are now two cases :
• the set Ω is finite or countable,
• the set Ω is uncountable.
In the first case, let us take
(2) Ω1 = { ω ∈ Ω | P ({ ω }) > 0 }
in other words, we discard from Ω all the points ω which have probability zero,
thus are redundant probabilistically. In this way Ω1 represents the set of proba-
bilistically non-redundant points. Then clearly
Ω1 ∈ F
since Ω1 = Ω \ { ω ∈ Ω | P ({ ω }) = 0 }, and the second set in the right hand
term is at most countable, thus in view of (1a), it belongs to F .
Further, corresponding to Ω1, let us take
(3) F1 = { A ∩ Ω1 | A ∈ F }
thus F1 ⊆ F , and P (B) > 0, for B ∈ F1, B 6= φ.
Finally, let us take
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(4) P1 : F1 −→ [0, 1] defined by P1 = P |F1
In this way we obtain the probabilistic redundancy free probability space
(5) (Ω1,F1, P1)
And now one can note that much of the probabilistic phenomena of interest are
the same on the probability spaces (Ω,F , P ) and (Ω1,F1, P1). And needless to
say, it is more convenient to work on the latter, precisely owing to the lack of
redundancies.
On the other hand, in the second case above, namely, when Ω is uncountable, one
cannot in general apply the above procedure in order to get rid of probabilistic
redundancies. For instance, let us take the simplest usual case when
(6) Ω = [0, 1] ⊂ R
while F and P are, respectively, the set of Lebesgue measurable subsets of [0, 1]
and the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]. Indeed, in this case we obtain
(7) Ω1 = φ
since every point x ∈ [0, 1] has Lebesgue measure zero. Thus we simply cannot
eliminate all probabilistically redundant points, since we do no longer remain with
a nontrivial probability space.
This failure related to the elimination of probabilistic redundancy in the Kol-
mogorov model in one of the main reasons in the technical difficulties encountered
in the study of stochastic processes with continuous time.
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